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A Framework for Managing Information Systems Security 
 
I.M.Y Woon  
School of Computing, National University of Singapore 




A review of current systems in the market place reveals that popular approaches such as 
checklists and security tools address specific problems or particular aspects of the security 
issue. This is inadequate and ineffective for today’s complex information and computer 
systems. The framework we propose is able to provide an overall solution to manage security 
in an effective manner. In the paper, we describe the components of this framework and show 
how they interact with each other to address the concerns of all levels of the organization 
hierarchy, the various and different parts of the security labyrinth. Feedback from initial 
evaluations shows promising results. 
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Computer site managers have an arsenal of security tools for protecting their information 
systems. They also have access to an assortment of security policies, security risk assessment 
tools and methodologies, enforcement check procedures and software. However, they do not 
have a structured approach in organizing the tools and procedures. Indeed, security in most 
heterogeneous environments is too often a patchwork of ad hoc security mechanisms. This is 
the result of the “quick and dirty” approach that most security administrators adopt to cope 
with new security risks, given that the time to respond each new threat is critical. In addition, 
security mechanisms utilized in organization over time, tend to deviate and change beyond 
their original purposes and become  “loose” and disorganised, thereby introducing security 
threats and reducing the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to counter the threats 
in the first place. Furthermore, the security architecture in most organization is not built on 
any formal security standards but either adopted and modified from other organizations or 
built by inexperienced and unqualified programmers doubling up as IT security manager. 
Thus, these organizations need a framework that will seamlessly integrate new security 
mechanisms with the existing security structure, at the same time adhering to strict and 
formal security concepts.  
 
The proposed solution, Information Security Self Assessment System (ISSAS), provides a 
security framework that assists computer site managers in organizing information security 
mechanisms. The basic building block of the system is derived from the set of standards 
spelled out in ITSEC (ITSEC, 1991) and TCSEC (DoD, 1985) There are several divisions 
within each of these standards and these divisions are ordered hierarchically with the highest 
division reserved for systems providing the most comprehensive security. These sets of 
standards encompass a wide range of areas such as password security standards, network 
security standards, etc. ISSAS uses the profile of a user’s site i.e. the hardware and software 
configurations and its business activity to determine the areas of security to assess and the 
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division to assess these at. Another essential component of ISSAS is the knowledge base of 
heuristic rules used to derive an aggregated security rating for site and to identify serious 
security breaches and violations. Access to tools and procedures are provided to help the user 
during the assessment phase to verify the state of a specific item e.g. password cracker 
program and the post-assessment phase where the user might desire to rectify the security 
loopholes identified by the system. Thus, ISSAS is founded on reputable standards which is 
able to: 
 
 incorporate all facets of computer security from the platform independent issues such as 
personnel security to platform dependent issues such as operating system vulnerabilities. 
 address concerns of all levels of the organization hierarchy. 
 be extended and updated easily. 
 
In this paper, we will describe in the main components of the framework. Subsequently, we 
will analyse the results of the tests we have performed using ISSAS and conclude with a 
discussion of the possible extensions to this work. 
 
 
2. Design of ISSAS 
 
There are 4 basic components in ISSAS: 
1. Security Standards 
2. Profile of User site  
3. Assessment Heuristics 
4. Automated Tools and Procedures 

















Figure 1: Components of ISSAS 
 
2.1 Security Standards 
 
ISSAS derives its set of standards from the set of standards spelled out in TCSEC and ITSEC 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly known as the Orange 














Department of Defense. It defines four divisions: A, B, C, and D with A denoting the system 
with the most comprehensive security rating. Each division represents a level of confidence 
one can place in the system for the protection of sensitive information.  The subclasses (given 
as numbers) for the B and C divisions indicate further levels of confidence within the division. 
Information Technology System Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) is the set of standards 
established by vendors and sponsors in Netherlands, France, Germany and United Kingdom. 
It defines six classes with class E6 being the class that provides the best assurance of security.  
 
TCSEC concentrates on confidentiality requirements while ITSEC covers this as well as 
integrity and availability requirements.  In reality, not many systems have been evaluated 
beyond class B1 as the implementation of the stringent requirements laid down for satisfying 
these classes are resource intensive. As such, we decided that a fine-grained stratification was 
not necessary. The simple and effective classification system also ensures that users will not 
be confused by a myriad of choices. Table 1 shows the correspondence between the various 
classes and divisions.  
 
Standards Corresponding Class/Division 
ISSAS 1 2 3 Standalone 
TCSEC A1 – B3 B2 – C2 C1 – D Un-rated 
ITSEC E6 – E5 E4 – E2 E1 – E0 Un-rated 
 
Table 1: Security class correspondence between ITSEC, TCSEC and ISSAS 
 
The classes of policies that is available in ISSAS for corporate sites are: 
 
 Class 1(Very Strict) - Security is of the utmost importance and the corporation's 
competitive advantage and health depends on it. 
 Class 2 ( Strict) - Security is important and is needed to meet most corporate needs  
 Class 3 (Normal) - Security is viewed only as a supporting role   
 Standalone - Security for standalone PCs that are not connected to any network 
 
The TCSEC and ITSEC documentation specifies requirements that are useful and necessary 
for the development of a secure site. These requirements are given in terms of control 
objectives to be attained such as the existence of a well-defined policy, the provision of an 
accountability system. For example, the control objective for accountability is given as: 
 
"Systems that are used to process or handle classified or other sensitive 
information must assure individual accountability whenever either a mandatory or 
discretionary security policy is invoked. Furthermore, to assure accountability the 
capability must exist for an authorized and competent agent to access and evaluate 
accountability information by a secure means, within a reasonable amount of time, 
and without undue difficulty”  
 
However, in an assessment system, the user needs to have a more specific set of questions to 
help him in deciding if these control objectives have been met. ISSAS identifies the areas of 
information system that are related to the control objectives. For example, accountability is 
dealt with in areas such as account security, intrusion detection, password and login.  By 











Anti-Malicious Software Security 
Network Security  
Backup Security 
E-mail Security 




Device File Security 
Batch Jobs Security 
Physical Security 
PC Security 
Operating System Security 




Table 2: Areas of security covered by ISSAS 
 
Table 3 is an expanded sub-section view of the area of password security. It shows some of 
the questions the user needs to answer. 
 
Password Security 
Are password features enabled?        Y        N 
Are tokens used for authentication?        Y        N 
Is the number of passwords that the SA (Security Administrator) has to 
remember more than 7?        Y        N 
Is the length of passwords used >= 7 characters?        Y        N 
Are passwords alphanumeric (i.e. mixture of numbers and letters)?        Y        N 
Are passwords unique (i.e. not used before)?        Y        N 
 
Table 3: Part of the question set for Password Security 
 
2.2 Profile of the User site 
 
ISSAS defines a user profile in terms of its hardware and software configurations its business 
activity, and the value it places on its IT assets. The questions to elicit this information can be 
divided into 3 sets: 
 
 The Basic Policy Set 
The main purpose of this question set is to determine the degree to which the site is 
networked. Networked sites will have more security issues to address and a greater degree 
of networking will increase the number of security issues will be encountered.  A 
question in this set is: “Is your site linked/connected to the Internet (i.e. WWW/FTP)?” 
 The General Security Template Set 
The main purpose of the questions in this set is to establish the nature and use of 
information stored within the site and how IT resources are used.  A question in this set 
is: “Are Executive Information System (EIS) available on this site?” 
 The Specific Security Template Set 
The main purpose of the questions in this set is to confirm the level of security 
classification the site should be assessed at. A question in this set is: “Are employees 
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allowed to work from home or outside the company (e. g. through dialup/wireless 
communication)? ”. 
 
This user profile is then used to determine the level of security classification that is required 
for that site. Different sets of questions will be posed to the user, depending on his site’s user 
profile. Table 4 shows that the user will have to answer 3 additional questions (Question 1,3 
and 4) if his site is to be assessed at the Very Strict Class rating. These questions will not be 
posed to him, if his site is to be assessed at a lower rating than this i.e. Strict or Normal Class. 
In addition, the question on password length (Question 2) differs for different class ratings. 
Under the Normal Class evaluation, the length is 6 or more characters while under the Very 
Strict Class evaluation, the length is 8 or more characters.  
 
Password Security 
1 Are tokens used for authentication?        Y        N 
2 Is the length of passwords used >= 8 characters?        Y        N 
3 Are passwords unique (i.e. not used before)?        Y        N 
4 Are passwords changed periodically (forced)?        Y        N 
 
Table 4 - “Different” questions on Password Security for Class 1 evaluation 
 
Not all areas of security will be assessed for all evaluation classes. For the Normal class 
evaluation, questions on areas like Label, Device File and Batch Job security will not be 
asked.  
 
2.3 Assessment Heuristics 
 
Assessment heuristics are employed during the assessment phase of the system. This 
assessment phase is preceded by the identification of the user’s profile. Heuristics for security 
analysis were derived by studying well known security literature (DoD 1985; ITSEC, 1991; 
National IT Standards Committee) and observing current trends. The heuristics use a 5-point 
rating scale as well as a description for each point in the scale. This rating scale reflects the 
fact that some security breaches have more severe consequences than others do. In Table 5, 
“Immediate failure” denotes security measures or items that are of the utmost importance to 
the organization and the failure to implement them offers an immediate opportunity of 
security breach. It is important to note that the ratings given reflect the needs of the industry 
in the authors’ country. Hence, the weight given is based on current trends and can be, and 
should be, changed over time to reflect the ever-changing needs of the IT industry and the 
needs of different countries and domains. 
 
Descriptive Rating per item Points  
Immediate failure  5 
Very important/Very serious 5 
Important/Serious 4 
Average 3 
Must implement if have the chance 2 
Implement for a complete security solution 1 
Table 5: Rating scale for Security Items 
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The rating system for the Table 3 is given in Table 6. A multi-dimensioned matrix establishes 
the relationship between all security items, via area of security or individually. The points 
allocated to the site and the weight of points is tagged to this relationship. For example, if 
password feature is NOT enabled, then any intrusion detection measure may not work. Thus, 
the user will not be queried on any intrusion detection measure and will be given the 
maximum points (indicating immediate failure) for that area of security. 
 
Password Security 
Are password features enabled? 5, immediate failure
Are tokens used for authentication? 5, Very important 
Is the number of passwords that the SA (Security Administrator) 
has to remember more than 7? 4 
Is the length of passwords used >= 7 characters? 3 
Are passwords alphanumeric (i.e. mixture of numbers and letters)? 2 
Are passwords unique (i.e. not used before)? 2 
 
Table 6: Ratings for part of the Password Security Measures 
 
Currently, the point allocation system is static. A dynamic point allocation system that 
considers the user site profile would be more realistic and would be part of our enhancement 
efforts. With each security item weighted and described, a scoring system for the site can thus 
be derived.  The overall site assessment status is thus arrived by considered the total number 
of points allocated to the site, the number of immediate failures and very serious breaches 
detected. Table 7 shows all the possible site security ratings  
 
Site Security Labels What it means 
Excellent Site passes security check with flying colours 
Very Good Site has good security 
Adequate Site has adequate security 
Poor Site failed security check 
Very Bad Site failed security check badly 
 
Table 7: Site Security Labels 
 
2.4 Automated Tools and Procedures 
 
Tools and procedures can be in-house developed or by third-party vendors (Fyodor, Singcert). 
They are provided to users to: 
 
 check and verify a particular area of security, for example if the user’s password is 
alphanumeric. 
 implement particular security features. 
 promote the user’s awareness of the availability of hacking tools 
 
Hence, they are organized according to the areas of security given in Table 2. Basically, there 
are 2 types of tools: 
 
 standalone, operating system specific tools for e.g. password crackers 
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 generic tools, which are accessible and executed online e.g.  SATAN-like utilities for 
checking ports etc. 
 
Procedures, on the other hand, are provided with on-line checklists that can be used to 
confirm the implementation of procedures. Thus, with the use of procedures and tools, users 
can further verify the activation of a particular security feature. This makes the security check 




Two types of reports will be generated after site check has been conducted: 
 
1. Quantitative analysis report 
This set of reports gives a graphical picture of security breaches of the site using: 
 Status Bar to display the security rating or state of site. The status bar shows a 
continuum from “unhealthy” to “healthy”. 
 Pie Chart to portray the top 5 areas with the worst security breaches. The size of each 
slice of the pie indicates the severity of breach of each area. 
 Bar Chart to show the security breaches that occurred in the most vulnerable area that 
was obtained in the pie chart in order of importance. 
2. Qualitative analysis report 
This gives a detailed result of security compliancy and coverage for the site. This includes 
a point-by-point breakdown of the detected security loopholes, statistics such as number 




3. Evaluating ISSAS 
 
An initial evaluation of the ISSAS prototype was conducted on the following units:  
 
 Profiling of site.  Tested for correctness of result from response (i.e. path that achieve 
Very Strict, Strict, Normal and Standalone classifications for site. 
 Security checks. The check reports are checked for correctness with reference to the 
ratings (i.e. Excellent, Very Good, Adequate, Poor and Very bad) given to the site after 
the check by verifying the statistics such as total points manually.  
 Procedures and Tools. The procedures and tools are tested in implementation (during 
acceptance testing). 
 
A brief description of the result obtained is as followed: 
 
 Profile: Normal 
 Result of check: 
• Security status: ADEQUATE 
• Total critical breaches: 5  
• Total very serious breaches:  2  
• Total serious breaches:  8 
 The critical breaches detected are: 
• D(1) Did not assign proper rights for important accounts.  
• E(1) SA/SSA are not cleared for the job.  
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• F(1) Auditing not done.  
• H(1) Firewall/proxy not set-up.  
• R(1) Passwords are embedded into system/batch files. 
 
The feedback we received from the technical manager and the system administrator was very 
encouraging. We also received invaluable feedback from them and will be incorporating 
these as part of our enhancement efforts. We are unable to divulge further details of the site 
or the testing results for obvious confidentiality reasons. 
 
 
4. Future Enhancements 
 
This section describes security mechanisms that can be included or “plugged” into ISSAS: 
 
 From general checks, evolve subsequent level checks. This would involve the following 
tasks: 
• Defining System-specific checks based on the security areas. These check should 
caters for all servers with different Operating Systems installed on the site. 
• Providing tools to carry on the check by connecting to the site via a point or PC using 
privileged and non-privileged accounts (automated or semi-automated that does not 
implement correction). Correction features should not be enabled to prevent 
unauthorized or unannounced changes to the systems. 
 Exhaustive penetration tests. Explore the possibility of using ISSAS as a tool to identify 
weak points of the site. The penetration test should be: 
• a semi-automated process that does not implement correction. 
• be activated within site, which at time of check is isolated externally and internally 
(i.e. no user). 
• explore potential breaches (e.g. areas such as login, intrusion, network, account etc) 
on all servers (inclusion of mail, news and web) within the site. 
• explore potential breaches  by conducting tests from outside the site. 
• explore potential breaches during normal operations e.g. probe station attack etc. 
 Explore a generic interface mechanism to integrate and incorporate results from other 
security tools such as SATAN 
 Usage of ISSAS for TCSEC/ITSEC equivalence site certification. As a result of 
compliance with the above ISSAS provided checks and implementation, the site can be 
given an ISSAS security classification which is recognised e.g. a site is certified to Class 





The biggest problem any security administrator can face is to build a coordinated and 
extendable architecture that is based on proven security standards that will make security a 
breeze, and which is compatible with existing policies and structures. Work in the area of 
ISSAS serves to address this problem. ISSAS provides a coordinated, platform independent 
easy-to-understand and implementable framework based on proven security standards and 
current trends that can be modifiable and easily extendable over time. It can become the 
backbone of any organization’s security solution whereby tools and procedures acts as “plug-






Implementation of the system was carried out by Aloysius Cheang as his honours year 
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